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Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights
Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights
By Martin Scheinin

Torkel Oppsahls minneseminar April 28 2004
Norwegian Centre for Human Rights
University of Oslo

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presentes the evolving understanding of indigenous peoples' land rights under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as reflected in the
practice of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the monitoring body established under
the ICCPR. The discussion is based on cases decided under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant, on the Committee's general comments and on the Committee's consideration
of periodic reports by States parties. As to the points of entry to the discussion on land
rights, two provisions of the ICCPR are identified: the right of all peoples to selfdetermination (Article 1) and the protection afforded, under the notions of 'culture' and
'minority' in Article 27, to indigenous peoples' rights related to lands and resources.
Somewhat paradoxically, the ICCPR which is a human rights treaty with neither a
property clause nor a land rights clause – nor, to that matter, any explicit reference to
'indigenousness', has become one of the main tools in positive human rights treaty law for
indigenous peoples' land rights claims.
The relevant provisions of the ICCPR read as follows:
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for
the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the
realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own
religion, or to use their own language.
As is noted, neither one of these provisions includes the notion of indigenousness, which
fact raises the question whether indigenous groups constitute 'minorities' under article 27
or 'peoples' under article 1. On the basis of the practice of the Human Rights Committee

the answer can be summarized as follows: Groups identifying themselves as indigenous
peoples generally fall under the protection of article 27 as 'minorities'. In addition, at least
some of them constitute 'peoples' for the purposes of article 1 and are beneficiaries of the
right of self-determination. Hence, the ICCPR does not give support to a position
according to which indigenous peoples are a specific category between minorities and
peoples, not entitled to the right of self-determination. In the light of the practice of the
Human Rights Committee, it is asserted that indigenous groups that are in a 'minority
situation', i.e. subject to a greater or lesser degree of dispossession or subordination by
another now dominant group, are entitled to protection as minorities under ICCPR article
27. At the same time, those of these groups that are ethnically, linguistically,
geographically, historically and politically – all things considered – sufficiently distinct
from the dominant population to qualify as 'peoples' under public international law, are
entitled to the right of self-determination under ICCPR article 1. In the same breath, it
must however be emphasized that in most cases the ultimate form of exercising the right
of self-determination, unilateral secession, is not available to indigenous peoples. For this
reason, they usually have to satisfy themselves with other arrangements that allow for
their exercise of the right of self-determination, including autonomy and land
management regimes based on the role of freely chosen political structures of the
indigenous people itself.
2. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' LAND RIGHTS UNDER ICCPR ARTICLE 27
The ICCPR is the only universally applicable human rights treaty that includes a specific
provision on the rights of minorities, or to be more exact, on the rights of members of
minorities.1 Here the Covenant also differs from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which does not include a clause on minorities, due to its emphasis on the
universality of human rights but also the partly negative experiences of the minority
protection arrangements under the League of Nations.
Article 27 is a rather modest provision in that it primarily addresses the negative
obligation of states not to deny members of minorities the right to enjoy their culture, to
profess and practice their religion or to use their own language. In legal shcolarship and
in the practice of the Human Rights Committee, however, also positive obligations have
been derived from the provision. For instance, the Committee’s General Comment No.
23,2 adopted in 1994, explicitly refers to such a dimension in its paragraph 6.1:
'Although article 27 is expressed in negative terms, that article, nevertheless, does
recognize the existence of a ‘right’ and requires that it shall not be denied.
1
2

However, see article 30 of the International Convention of the Rights of the Child.
HRC General Comment No. 23 (50), reproduced in UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, pp. 147–150.

Consequently, a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and
the exercise of this right are protected against their denial or violation. Positive
measures of protection are, therefore, required not only against the acts of the State
party itself, whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities,
but also against the acts of other persons within the State party.'
Already the wording of article 27 implies that although protection is afforded to the
individual members of minorities, the substance of minority rights entails a collective
dimension: they are to be enjoyed ‘in community with other members of the group’. In its
general comment the Committee uses this collective dimension as the starting-point for
its reasoning in favour of positive or affirmative measures of protection: ‘as long as those
measures are aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of the
rights guaranteed under article 27, they may constitute a legitimate differentiation under
the Covenant, provided that they are based on reasonable and objective criteria’.3
Article 27 of the Covenant represents a broad understanding of minorities and minority
rights, when compared to some other instruments that use the notion of ‘national
minorities’ and may limit themselves to protecting well-established groups that have a
long history in the country concerned and whose members must be citizens of the state.
The Covenant speaks of ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’ and applies even to
groups that are recent or even temporary in the country in question.4 The Committee has
also emphasized that the protection of article 27 does not depend on any formal
recognition by the state of the existence of a minority but is, rather, an objective fact.5
Although article 27 does not employ the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’, much of the case
law developed under the provision has been related to claims by such groups. In General
Comment No. 23 the Committee emphasized the applicability of article 27 in respect of
indigenous peoples.6 In particular, the notion of ‘culture’ has been interpreted as
affording protection to the nature-based way of life, land rights and economy of
indigenous peoples. In the terms of paragraph 7 of the general comment:
‘With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article 27, the
Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular
way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous
peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the
right to live in reserves protected by law.’
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Idem, paragraph 6.2.
Idem, paras 5.1 and 5.2.
5
Idem, para. 5.2.
6
Idem, paras. 3.2 and 7.
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Turning now to the case-law by the Human Rights Committee under the Optional
Protocol, the case of Lovelace v. Canada7 focuses on an individual dimension of article
27, namely the right of the individual not to be denied membership in an indigenous
group with which she wishes to identify herself, and into which she belongs according to
some objective criteria of, for example, ethnicity. In the particular case, the Committee
found a violation of article 27 due to the permanent exclusion of the female author from
her aboriginal community after marrying an outsider. The exclusion resulted from a rule
enacted by the State Party in the form of federal legislation and not applicable to male
persons who married an outsider. In the specific circumstances of the case the
Committee's conclusion was formulated as follows:
'17. The case of Sandra Lovelace should be considered in the light of the fact that her
marriage to a non-Indian has broken up. It is natural that in such a situation she wishes to
return to the environment in which she was born, particularly as after the dissolution of
her marriage her main cultural attachment again was to the Maliseet band. Whatever may
be the merits of the Indian Act in other respects, it does not seem to the Committee that to
deny Sandra Lovelace the right to reside on the reserve is reasonable, or necessary to
preserve the identity of the tribe. The Committee therefore concludes that to prevent her
recognition as belonging to the band is an unjustifiable denial of her rights under article
27 of the Covenant, read in the context of the other provisions referred to.'
Another case related to the same dimension of article 27 is Kitok v. Sweden.8 Although
Mr Kitok had, because of his absence from his local community, lost full membership in
the Sami village and consequently full reindeer herding rights, he was not prevented from
moving back to the community and from participating in the reindeer herding activities
which are constitutive for the Sami culture. In the circumstances, the Committee
considered that there was no violation of article 27. However, the Committee expressed
its concern over the operation of Swedish legislation, and emphasized the need to apply
(also) objective criteria in the determination of whether an individual who wishes to
identify himself with the group is recognized as a member.9
Through its reference to reindeer herding as an important element of the indigenous
culture of the Sami, the Kitok case illustrates another important dimension of article 27,
the recognition of traditional or otherwise typical economic activities as ‘culture’, in
particular in regard to indigenous peoples.10 This dimension was developed in the case
7

Sandra Lovelace v. Canada (Communication No. 24/1977), Views adopted 30 July 1981, Report of the Human
Rights Committee, GAOR, Thirty-sixth session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/36/40), pp. 166-175.
8
Ivan Kitok v. Sweden (Communication No. 197/1985), Views adopted 27 July 1988, Report of the Human Rights
Committee, GAOR, Forty-third Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/43/40), pp. 221–230.
9
See para. 9.7 of the Committee’s Views.
10
See paras. 4.3 and 9.2 of the Committee’s Views.

Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada,11 in which a violation of article 27 was established
because ‘historical inequities, to which the State party refers, and certain more recent
developments threaten the way of life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band’.12 The
factual background of the case related to the exploitation of oil, gas and timber resources
in areas traditionally used by the Band for hunting and fishing. Over a long period of time
the cumulative effect of these forms of competing use of land and resources had
effectively destroyed the resource basis of traditional hunting and fishing for the Lubicon
Band.
Much of the Committee's subsequent case law under article 27 has been related to this
dimension of article 27, the link between the notion of 'culture' in the treaty provision and
traditional forms of indigenous peoples' economic life on their historical lands. The case
Länsman v. Finland No. 113 was related to the harmful effects of a stone quarry in
relation to reindeer herding activities of the indigenous Sami. Although no violation of
article 27 was found, the Committee established several general principles for the
interpretation of article 27. It emphasized that article 27 does not protect only traditional
means of livelihood but even their adaptation to modern times.14 As to what kind of
interference with a minority culture constitutes ‘denial’ in the sense of article 27, the
Committee developed the combined test of meaningful consultation of the group15 and
the sustainability of the indigenous or minority economy.16
The Committee’s Views in the cases of Länsman v. Finland No. 217 related to
governmental logging activities in the reindeer herding lands of the same Sami
community and Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand18 build on and develop the same
11

Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (Communication 167/1984), Views adopted 26
March 1990, Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR, Thirty-eighth session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/38/40), pp. 130.
12
Paragraph 33 of the Committee's Views.
13
Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland (Communication 511/1992), Views adopted: 26 October 1994, Report of the
Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, GAOR, Fiftieth Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/50/40), pp. 66–76.
14
Paragraph 9.3 of the Committee's Views: 'The right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto but
has to be placed in context. In this connection, the Committee observes that article 27 does not only protect
traditional means of livelihood of national minorities, as indicated in the State party’s submission. Therefore, that
the authors may have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the years and practice it with the help of
modern technology does not prevent them from invoking article 27 of the Covenant.'
15
See para. 9.6 of the Committee's Views.
16
See para. 9.8 of the Committee's Views: 'With regard to the authors’ concerns about future activities, the
Committee notes that economic activities must, in order to comply with article 27, be carried out in a way that the
authors continue to benefit from reindeer husbandry.'
17
Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland (Communication No. 671/1995), Views adopted 30 October 1996, Report of
the Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, UN doc. A/52/40 (Vol. II), pp. 191-204. See, in particular, paragraphs 10.4 to
10.7.
18
Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand (Communication No. 547/1993), Views adopted 27 October 2000, Report
of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, UN doc. A/56/40 (Vol. II), pp. 11–29. See, in particular, paragraphs 9.4 to
9.9.

principles.
Still today, the Lubicon Band case remains as the sole one where the Committee has
found a violation of article 27 because of competing use of land and resources interfering
with the economy and life of the indigenous community. The case of Äärelä and
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland19can be seen as a response to this problem and as a shift in the
litigation strategy of the Finnish Sami. The case itself was very similar to Länsman No. 2,
relating to government logging in the reindeer herding lands of the herdsmen's
cooperative in which the two authors were members. Although the authors based their
case before domestic courts on ICCPR article 27 and comparable provisions of domestic
law, they also addressed the Supreme Court of Finland and later the Committee with their
misgivings of how they had been treated by the Finnish courts, claiming a violation of the
fair trial clause in ICCPR article 14.
After establishing a violation of article 14 in two respects, the Committee then stated that
considers that it did not have sufficient information in order to be able to draw
independent conclusions on the factual importance of the lands in question to reindeer
husbandry and the long-term impacts on the sustainability of husbandry, and the
consequences under article 27 of the Covenant. Hence, the Committee was 'unable to
conclude that the logging of 92 hectares, in these circumstances, amounts to a failure on
the part of the State party to properly protect the authors' right to enjoy Sami culture, in
violation of article 27 of the Covenant'.20 However, when addressing the authors' right to
an effective remedy for the violations of fair trial they had suffered, the Committee called
for a reconsideration of the article 27 claim on the domestic level:
'[T]he Committee considers that, as the decision of the Court of Appeal was tainted by a
substantive violation of fair trial provisions, the State party is under an obligation to
reconsider the authors' claims.'21 The implementation of this part of the Committee's
Views will most likely be discussed when the HRC later this year considers the periodic
report by Finland.
Compared to certain other treaty regimes, notably ILO Convention No. 169, the
weakness of ICCPR Article 27 as a basis for indigenous land rights lies in the absence of
any reference to the right of property in Article 27 or elsewhere in the ICCPR. For
purposes of compliance with Article 27, it is sufficient to secure the use of indigenous
lands so that the combined test of effective participation by the indigenous group and the
sustainability of its economic activities is secured. Article 27 would give support to
19

Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland (Communication No. 779/1997), Views adopted 24 October 2001,
Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, UN doc. A/57/40 (Vol. II), pp. 117-130.
20
Idem, paragraph 7.6.
21
Idem, paragraph 8.2.

indigenous title to land only in cases where it is proven that no other arrangement will
meet this test. Hence, it was in my view correct that the Norwegian Supreme Court
referred in the Svartskog case22 to the non-incorporated ILO Convention No. 169 as a
subsidiary source of law in support of its conclusion of the existence of a collective title
to traditional Sami lands, instead of basing itself on Article 27 of the duly incorporated
ICCPR and the priority clause in Section 3 of the Human Rights Act
(Menneskerettighetsloven). The latter line of argument would result in the recognition of
effective Sami control of the lands, to secure the continued well-being of their way of
life, rather than in affording title to land.
3. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
Moving now to the question of the right of self-determination as a basis of indigenous
land rights and having just referred to ILO Convention No. 169, it needs to be clarified
that the fact that this convention does not include a clause on the right of selfdetermination does not mean that any indigenous peoples, or the Sami in particular,
would not qualify as beneficiaries of that right. Just as the absence of the right of
property in the ICCPR does not exclude the possibility of indigenous peoples' claims on
land title being successful on other legal grounds such as Article 14 of the ILO
Convention, the absence of a self-determination clause from the ILO Convention does
not prevent indigenous peoples from raising the banner of self-determination on the
basis of other treaties, such as the twin Covenants of 1966. Article 1, paragraph 3, of
ILO Convention No. 169 should be taken as meaning what it says, namely that the use
of the term 'peoples' in that Convention does not have 'any implications' as regards the
rights which may attach to the term 'peoples' under public international law. Just as the
reference to 'peoples' in the ILO Convention does not have positive implications in
respect of turning into peoples groups that otherwise would fall short of the
distinctiviness required under international law, the same reference does not have the
negative implication of denying the status of a people to a group that irrespective of the
ILO Convention qualifies as a people under public international law. The reason for
Article 1, paragraph 3, in the ILO Convention is obvious: the broad and inclusive
criteria for indigenous and tribal peoples in the preceding parts of Article 1, resulting in
that the Convention is applicable in respect of a number of minorities and groups that
would not qualify as peoples under public international law. Nevertheless, within that
broad scope of application of the ILO Convention there is a smaller group of
'indigenous peoples' that do qualify as 'peoples' also under international law.

22

Rt. 2001 s. 1229.

The case of Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand mentioned in the previous section of this
paper is one of the instances where the Human Rights Committee has recognized a link
between article 27 and article 1 through the interpretive effect of the right of selfdetermination when addressing the application of article 27 in a case brought by
indigenous authors.1 This dimension of interdependence between articles 1 and 27 was
present already in the Lubicon Lake Band case and in the combined test of
sustainability and participation developed in Länsman No. 1. But it was only in
Mahuika that the Committee formally recognized the relevance of article 1 in
addressing article 27 claims. This is why a presentation of the position and substance of
the right of self-determination in the Covenant needs to be addressed in a historical
perspective in order to understand to what extent indigenous peoples are entitled to that
right.
In addition to a wide range of individual human rights the ICCPR affords protection to
the right of ‘all peoples’ to self-determination (article 1). The provision which is
identical to article 1 in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
comprises of three paragraphs that relate to the various dimensions of selfdetermination. Paragraph 1 proclaims the right of self-determination and its main
dimensions: all peoples’ right ‘to freely determine their political status’ (political
dimension) and to pursue their ‘economic, social and cultural development’ (resource
dimension). The political dimension, in turn, includes an external aspect of sovereignty
and an internal aspect of governance which in turn can be linked to article 25 that
requires democratic governance. This link has on occasion been emphasized by the
Committee in its Concluding Observations.2
As already mentioned earlier in this paper, a people’s right to self-determination does
not automatically entail a right of unilateral secession (statehood) for every group that
qualifies as a distinct people. The right of secession is recognized only under specific
conditions, for instance as was done by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec
Secession Case:
'In summary, the international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a
right to external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is
oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable
group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic,
social and cultural development. In all three situations, the people in question are
1

Mahuika (footnote 18, supra), paragraph 9.2: 'Furthermore, the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the
interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular article 27.'
2
For example: ‘20. The Committee notes with concern that the Congolese people have been unable, owing to the
postponement of general elections, to exercise their right to self-determination in accordance with article 1 of the
Covenant and that Congolese citizens have been deprived of the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public
affairs in accordance with article 25 of the Covenant’. Concluding Observations on the Republic of the Congo
(2000), UN doc. CCPR/C/ 79/Add.118.
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entitled to a right to external self-determination because they have been denied the
ability to exert internally their right to self-determination.'3
In the context of the case it is clear that by 'external self-determination' the Supreme
Court of Canada was referring to the possible unilateral secession by the province of
Quebec from the union of Canada. It should, however, be emphasized that there might
be other 'external' forms of self-determination that are not subject to the very
demanding conditions international law attaches to secession, for instance the right to
represent internationally an indigenous people in relevant international negotiations or
conferences.4
Paragraph 2 of ICCPR article 1 elaborates further the resource dimension of selfdetermination through proclaiming the right of all peoples to dispose of their natural
wealth and resources. This clause and especially its last sentence according to which a
people may not be deprived of its own means of subsistence has been relied in support
of land rights by many groups that proclaim themselves as distinctive indigenous
peoples in countries where other ethnic groups, typically of European descent, are in a
dominant position.
Paragraph 3 of article 1 relates to a further dimension of self-determination, namely the
collective responsibility of States Parties to promote the realization of selfdetermination elsewhere than within their own territory. The Human Rights Committee
has relied on this solidarity dimension of the right of self-determination in the reporting
procedure under article 40, through questions on the States Parties’ measures to
promote the self-determination of the Palestinian people and in South Africa.5
In 1984, the Human Rights Committee adopted a general comment on article 1.6 Due to
its date of adoption, the general comment does not reflect later developments in the
Committee’s approach to article 1 under the reporting procedure and the Optional
Protocol.
The word ‘people’ is not defined in article 1 or elsewhere in the Covenant. Hence, the
Covenant leaves room for different interpretations as to whether the whole population
of a state party constitutes ‘a people’ in the meaning of article 1, or whether several
distinct peoples exist in at least some of the States Parties to the Covenant. The
Committee’s pronouncements in relatively recent Concluding Observations on reports
by countries with indigenous peoples reflect an understanding that at least certain
3

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paragraph 128.
For instance, section 6 of the Sami Parliament Act of Finland (Act No. 974 of 1995) recognizes this external
form of self-determination to the Sami, to be exercised by the elected Sami Parliament.
5
See, Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl am Rhein: N. P.
Engel, 1993), p. 23.
6
HRC General Comment No. 12 (21), reproduced in UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, pp. 121–122.
4
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indigenous groups qualify as ‘peoples’ under article 1. As this approach was first made
explicit in the Committee's concluding observations on Canada, a quotation is justified:
'The Committee notes that, as the State party acknowledged, the situation of the
aboriginal peoples remains "the most pressing human rights issue facing Canadians". In
this connection, the Committee is particularly concerned that the State party has not yet
implemented the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
(RCAP). With reference to the conclusion by RCAP that without a greater share of
lands and resources institutions of aboriginal self-government will fail, the Committee
emphasizes that the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples must
be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that they may not be
deprived of their own means of subsistence (art. 1, para. 2). The Committee
recommends that decisive and urgent action be taken towards the full implementation
of the RCAP recommendations on land and resource allocation. The Committee also
recommends that the practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights be abandoned
as incompatible with article 1 of the Covenant.’7
It is to be noted that the recognition of the existence of more than one 'people' within
the territory of the country and the enjoyment by them of the right of self-determination
(albeit not of its extreme manifestation, secession), had been expressed by the highest
judicial authority of the country concerned, in the Quebec Secession Case decided in
1998. The Supreme Court of Canada stated, inter alia:
'It is clear that "a people" may include only a portion of the population of an existing
state. The right to self-determination has developed largely as a human right, and is
generally used in documents that simultaneously contain references to "nation" and
"state". The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that the reference to "people"
does not necessarily mean the entirety of a state's population. To restrict the definition
of the term to the population of existing states would render the granting of a right to
self-determination largely duplicative, given the parallel emphasis within the majority
of the source documents on the need to protect the territorial integrity of existing states,
and would frustrate its remedial purpose.'8
Although the applicability of article 1 on self-determination to indigenous peoples was
first recognized by the Committee when dealing with the report by Canada when the
country's own Supreme Court had first affirmed that several 'peoples' may exist within
7

Concluding Observations on Canada, paragraph 8. UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.105 (1999).
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paragraph 124. In para. 139 of the opinion the Court
refers to the importance of the rights and concerns of aboriginal peoples in the event of a unilateral secession by
the province of Quebec, with an explicit reference to the issue of 'defining the boundaries of a seceding Quebec
with particular regard to the northern lands occupied largely by aboriginal peoples'. However, as the Court came
to the conclusion that the hypothetical right of self-determination of Quebec could not carry as far as to unilateral
secession, it was 'unnecessary to explore further the concerns of the aboriginal peoples'.

8
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one state, the Committee has followed the same approach also in respect of other
countries with distinct indigenous peoples within their boundaries. Explicit references
to either article 1 or to the notion of self-determination have been made in the
Committee's concluding observations on Mexico,9 Norway,10 Australia,11 Denmark12
and Sweden.13 As in the case of Canada, paragraph 2 of article 1, i.e. the resource
dimension of self-determination has received particular emphasis in the context of
indigenous peoples. For instance, in its concluding observations on Australia, the
Committee stressed that the State party 'should take the necessary steps in order to
secure for the indigenous inhabitants a stronger role in decision-making over their
traditional lands and natural resources'. The Committee's concluding observations on
Norway and Sweden have made it clear that the Human Rights Committee recognizes
the Sami as a 'people' under ICCPR article 1, i.e. as a beneficiary of the right of selfdetermination.
Although it is nowadays clear that many indegenous peoples qualify as beneficiaries of
the right of self-determination under ICCPR article 1 there still exist some confusion in
the matter, due to the fact that article 1 is procedurally in a different position than other
human rights affirmed in the Covenant. While article 1 is covered by the mandatory
reporting obligation of all States parties under article 40, as well as under the (never
utilized) inter-State complaint procedure under article 41, the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR, allowing for individual complaints, excludes cases directly under article 1 of
the Covenant due to the narrow formulation of the so-called victim requirement in
article 1 of the Optional Protocol. According to that provision, the Committee may
consider 'communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant'.
While the right of self-determination (ICCPR article 1) falls under the notion of 'any of
the rights set forth in the Covenant', it is a truly collective right proclaimed to 'all
peoples', and individuals cannot, in the interpretation of the Committee, claim to be
individually affected as victims of a violation of that right.
This approach was taken in the Lubicon Lake Band case under which the Band's
original claim under article 1 was declared inadmissible with the following reasoning in
1987:
9

Concluding Observations on Mexico, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999).
Concluding Observations on Norway, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (1999).
11
Concluding Observations on Australia, UN doc. CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000).
12
Concluding Observations on Denmark, UN doc. CCPR/CO/70/DNK (2000).
13
Concluding Observations on Sweden, UN doc. CCPR/CO/74/SWE (2002), para. 15: "The Committee is
concerned at the limited extent to which the Sami Parliament can have a significant role in the decision-making
process on issues affecting the traditional lands and economic activities of the indigenous Sami people, such as
projects in the fields of hydroelectricity, mining and forestry, as well as the privatization of land (arts. 1, 25 and 27
of the Covenant). The State party should take steps to involve the Sami by giving them greater influence in
decision-making affecting their natural environment and their means of subsistence."
10
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'13.3 With regard to the State party's contention that the author's communication
pertaining to self-determination should be declared inadmissible because "the
Committee's jurisdiction, as defined by the Optional Protocol, cannot be invoked by an
individual when the alleged violation concerns a collective right", the Committee
reaffirmed that the Covenant recognizes and protects in most resolute terms a people's
right of self-determination and its right to dispose of its natural resources, as an
essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human
rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights. However, the Committee
observed that the author, as an individual, could not claim under the Optional Protocol
to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in article 1 of
the Covenant, which deals with rights conferred upon peoples, as such.
13.4 The Committee noted, however, that the facts as submitted might raise issues
under other articles of the Covenant, including article 27. Thus, in so far as the author
and other members of the Lubicon Lake Band were affected by the events which the
author has described, these issues should be examined on the merits, in order to
determine whether they reveal violations of article 27 or other articles of the
Covenant.'14
The Committee’s Views in the same case, adpoted in 1990, follow this approach as it is
quite clear that article 1 was of relevance in the Committee’s argumentation on other
alleged violations of the Covenant. Before reaching its conclusion that article 27 had
been violated the Committee stated: 'Although initially couched in terms of alleged
breaches of the provisions of article 1 of the Covenant, there is no doubt that many of
the claims presented raise issues under article 27'.15
Between Lubicon and Mahuika there have been cases in which the Committee’s
approach of article 1 not being subject to the Optional Protocol procedure was
expressed in more straightforward terms. These cases include A. D. v. Canada and
Kitok v. Sweden.16 However, in its recent case law the Committee has returned to the
approach reflected in Lubicon, now even explicitly recognizing that although article 1
cannot itself be the basis for a claim by an individual the right of self-determination
may affect the interpretation of other provisions of the Covenant, including the right of
members of a minority to enjoy their own culture (article 27). The same approach as in
Mahuika was followed in the case of Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia.17
14

Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (footnote 11, supra).
Idem, para. 32.2 of the Committee's Views.
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A.D. v. Canada (Communication No. 78/1980), Views adopted 20 July 1984, Report of the Human Rights
Committee, GAOR, Thirty-ninth Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/39/40), pp. 200–204. Ivan Kitok v. Sweden
(Communication No. 197/1985), Views adopted 27 July 1988, Report of the Human Rights Committee, GAOR,
Forty-third Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/43/40), pp. 221–241.
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‘Furthermore, the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the
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Further light on the issue of interdependence between the right of self-determination
and other provisions of the Covenant is shed by the case of Gillot et al. v. France,
decided in 2002.18 The complaint was related to restrictions in the right to participate in
referendums in New Caledonia, allegedly in violation of article 25 of the Covenant
(right of public participation). Interpreting article 25 in the light of article 1, the
Committee considered that in the context of referendums arranged in a process of
decolonization and self-determination, it was legitimate to limit participation to persons
with sufficiently close ties with the territory whose future was being decided. As the
residence requirements for participation in the referendums in question were neither
disproportionate nor discriminatory, the Committee concluded that there was no
violation of article 25.
The novelty in the interpretive effect of article 1 in Gillot was that the complaint was
not brought by the indigenous or minority group but by certain citizens of the State
party who considered their rights violated by their exclusion from the selfdetermination process. Hence, the right of self-determination was invoked by the State
party19 and then applied by the Committee as justification for an exclusion of
newcomers from referendums. The key passages in the Committee’s disposition of the
case read:
‘13.4 Although the Committee does not have the competence under the Optional
Protocol to consider a communication alleging violation of the right to selfdetermination protected in article 1 of the Covenant, it may interpret article 1, when this
is relevant, in determining whether rights protected in parts II and III of the Covenant
have been violated. The Committee is of the view, therefore, that, in this case, it may
take article 1 into account in interpretation of article 25 of the Covenant.
…
13.16 The Committee recalls that, in the present case, article 25 of the Covenant must
be considered in conjunction with article 1. It therefore considers that the criteria
established are reasonable to the extent that they are applied strictly and solely to
ballots held in the framework of a self-determination process. Such criteria, therefore,
can be justified only in relation to article 1 of the Covenant, which the State party does.
Without expressing a view on the definition of the concept of "peoples" as referred to in
article 1, the Committee considers that, in the present case, it would not be
unreasonable to limit participation in local referendums to persons "concerned" by the
future of New Caledonia who have proven, sufficiently strong ties to that territory.’
No. 760/1997), Views adopted 25 July 2000, Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, GAOR, Fifty-fifth
Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/55/40), pp. 140–160.
18
Marie-Hélène Gillot et al. v France (Communication No. 932/2000), Views Adopted 15 July 2002, Report of
the Human Rights Committee, Vol. II, GAOR, Fifty-seventh Session, Suppl. No. 40 (A/57/40), pp. 270–293.
19
See, in particular, paragraphs 8.3, 8.9 and 8.31 of the Committee’s Views.
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The Gillot case is a logical continuation of the Committee’s approach built through the
reporting procedure under article 40 of the ICCPR and the recognition of the
interpretive effect of article 1 also in cases under the Optional Protocol. Many of the
indigenous peoples of the world qualify as ‘peoples’ for the purposes of ICCPR article
1 and are, hence, entitled to the right of self-determination. As is reflected in the
practice of the Committee, the resource dimension of is of particular relevance for
indigenous peoples’ claims under the right of self-determination and makes the right of
self-determination an important vehicle for indigenous peoples' claims on land rights.
4. THE ICCPR, THE FINNMARK BILL AND THE LAND RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
In their expert review on the Finnmark Bill, professors Hans Petter Graver and Geir
Ulfstein gave main attention to ILO Convention No. 169. This is fully justified, and the
present author agrees with the two experts that the specific land rights provisions in the
ILO Convention should have main attention when designing a solution to Sami land
rights in Norway, a country that is a party to the ILO Convention.
However, on the basis of the overview presented above in this paper it is possible to say
more than Graver and Ulfstein do on the compatibility of the Finnmark Bill with the
ICCPR. After referring to the concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee
in respect of Canada and Norway, Graver and Ulfstein conclude that the Committee has
been approaching article 1 in a cautious manner and that it is therefore not possible to
make precise conclusions on the requirements of article 1. This conclusion is fair but
does not exclude another expert going deeper into the material and trying to express a
more definite conclusion. When expressing an opinion the present author who is both
an academic and a member of the Human Rights Committee, of course, draws upon
existing practice of the Committee, instead of trying to rush to advance determination
of whether the Finnmark Act would violate internationally recognized rights of the
Sami. Being a member of the Human Rights Committee, I have always avoided making
any advance comment as to whether something is or is not a human rights violation
under the Covenant. However, I feel quite free to comment, on the abstract level and in
particular in relation to pending Bills that are subject to public discussion prior to their
adoption, as to whether a law appears to be compatible or incompatible with the
Covenant. This I do frequently in Finland, and I feel no hesitation to do it in Norway,
either.
It is my view that in the light of existing practice by the Human Rights Committee the
Finnmark Bill is not in accordance with articles 1 and 27 of the ICCPR, the two
provisions taken together, if the Bill were to result, despite the opposition of the Sami,
in the establishment of a new decision-making structure (Finnmarkseidendommen)
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designed by the state through legislation and not by the Sami, aiming to co-opt the Sami
in a mixed decision-making structure where they would not have a decisive role, and
leaving it largely to that decision-making structure to protect and promote the Sami
culture and economy. Such a parallel structure would, if put in place in the situation just
described, would unavoidably compete with the decision-making structures of the Sami
themselves. The right of an indigenous group that qualifies as a people under article 1
to control their traditional lands and the natural resources on those lands is an important
dimension of self-determination. Self-determination also entails a people's right to
design its own decision-making structures. Hence, the role of the elected Sami
Parliament and other institutions created by the Sami themselves, in controlling the use
of lands and resources as the material basis for Sami culture and means of livelihood is
crucial for securing compliance with ICCPR article 1. The same goes for compliance
with article 27 where effective participation by the indigenous group and the
sustainability of the indigenous economy are the decisive criteria, instead of how the
issue of ownership of lands is settled.
Let me remind what the Human Rights Committee has stated in its concluding
observations on Norway and Sweden. In the case of Norway, the Committee explicitly
referred to articles 1 and 27 together when taking positive note of the strengthening of
the Sami Parliament and the then (1999) visible trend to ensure full consultation with
the Sami in matters affecting their traditional means of livelihood.20 When expressing
its concerns in the same document, the Committee requested Norway “to report on the
Sami people's right to self-determination under article 1 of the Covenant, including
paragraph 2 of that article”.21
Similarly, in its concluding observations on Sweden the Committee expressed concern
at the limited extent to which the Sami Parliament can have a significant role in the
decision-making process on issues affecting the traditional lands and economic
activities of the Sami, and explicitly referred to articles 1, 25 and 27 together. The
Committee redommended that Sweden should give the Sami “greater influence in
decision-making affecting their natural environment and their means of subsistence."22
To me, it is surprising that the discussion in Norway gives so little attention to the right
of self-determination in the discussion on the Finnmark Bill, despite of the
pronouncements by the Human Rights Committee that have explicitly emphasized the
importance of the powers of the Sami Parliament in assessing compliance with the
Covenant.
Further, under both article 1 and article 27 the Human Rights Committee has expressed
its support to regimes where certain rights related to a traditional indigenous territory
20
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are reserved to the members of the group. In its General Comment No. 23 on article 27,
the Committee stated that in the case of indigenous peoples the right of the members of
the group to enjoy their culture may entail reserving lands to them exclusively.23 Such
exclusive land rights will amount to permissible positive measures under article 27 as
long as they are based on reasonable and objective criteria and are aimed at correcting
conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of article 27 rights by the group.24
Similarly, in the Gillot case that includes an interpretive reference to article 1, the
Committee found permissible under article 25 that 'newcomers' were excluded from the
decision-making on the future status and self-determination of New Caledonia. In its
Concluding Observations on New Zealand, in turn, the Committee congratulated the
state party for progress in the protection and promotion of Maori land rights, and
specifically gave its support to providing compensation to affected third parties in order
to facilitate this process:
"The approach of providing compensation from public funds helps to avoid tensions
that might otherwise hamper the recognition of indigenous land and resource rights."25
It is the position of the present author that in order to comply with ICCPR articles 1 and
27, taken together, any new arrangement for land ownership and management in
Finnmark must be accepted by the Sami. As to what would constitute a proper form of
such acceptance, reference is made to the Mahuika case in which the Human Rights
Committee paid careful attention to the specific modalities of a broad nation-wide
consultation process through which broad Maori support to a comprehensive fiheries
settlement was obtained.
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Idem, paragraph 6.2.
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